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CONTENTS
A. Introduction
B. Background
C. Structure of
Economic Decision-Making
1. Lead Role of
the MFDP
2. Policy
Formation
3. Rural
Development Policies
4. Employment
and Incomes Policies
5. Other Policy
Mechanisms
D. Sources of
Economic Analysis Outside of Government
E. Number and
Quality of Trained Analysts Available
F. Training
Opportunities
1. Advanced
Degrees
2. In-service
Training
3. University
of Botswana
4. Business
Education
G. Conclusions
and Observations
A.
INTRODUCTION
Botswana seems
at first to be a strange choice for a rapid assessment of deficiencies
in policy-making capabilities in Africa. Not only is the Botswana
economy growing at an enviable rate, over 12 percent per year, but its
policies governing the economy and the distribution of resources are
generally considered to be sound and enlightened. The country’s
social, political and racial policies are also held in high regard, an
exceptional achievement for a country virtually surrounded by
minority-ruled regimes at the time of its independence.
In fact, it is
the paradigmatic nature of Botswana’s economic and political systems
that makes the country of unusual interest. It represents a “best case
scenario,” a model of African development under nearly ideal political
and economic conditions. Yet with all its favorable attributes and
circumstances, if diamond exports were somehow removed from the economy
while retaining the availability of capital they make possible, the
growth rate of the economy has been estimated at between 4.0 and 4.7
percent per year. This is still very high, compared with most other
African economies, but it is only around 1 percent more than the rate of
natural increase, and hardly an abundant return on the sound policy
environment that has been created.
Looking at the
Botswana experience, other countries on the continent, with less stable
and enlightened policy environments and fewer resources with which to
work, may find dim the prospects for rapidly emerging from their
economic doldrums as a result of adopting more sensible economic
policies. Unless some explanation can be found for the lackluster
performance of the non-mineral sectors of the Botswana economy, the
incentives for policy reform in other countries may be meager, and the
rewards for policy reform may be disappointing.
B.
BACKGROUND
Setswana-speaking
people settled the area now called Botswana in increasing numbers in the
19th Century, many of them refugees from the Zulu wars. In 1885, the
British responded to requests from Botswana chiefs for assistance by
declaring the area the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, but they exhibited
little interest either in settling there themselves or in investing in
the development of the indigenous people. It was assumed, at least until
the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, that the territory would
eventually join South Africa. Bechuanaland was actually governed by
officials living outside its borders in Mafeking, South Africa.
Only in the
late 1950s, when eventual independence became likely, did the pace of
development increase. By 1971, when the first census was taken, Botswana
had a population of just over 630,000. Of the labor force, defined as
everyone over ten years of age, 57 percent of the men were engaged in
traditional agriculture, 10 percent in full-time wage employment, 13
percent combined agriculture and wage employment, and 20 percent, mostly
school children and Bushmen, had no discernable economic activity. Only
3 percent of women over ten were in wage employment.
Educational
attainments at the time were modest. Only 2 percent of the population
over 55 years had completed primary school or better, and even in the
25-40 age group the percentage was only 14. There were, however, 140
university graduates, slightly more than Tanzania, with 20 times the
population, had at independence.
The discovery
of vast wealth in diamonds in 1969 came three years after independence;
and in 1970 ninety percent of exports were still beef products. The
country was attractive to the outside world, and to the donor community,
mainly because of its precarious position as a majority-ruled poor
country with South Africa, Southwest Africa, and Rhodesia as neighbors.
The leadership of Seretse Khama, the first president, was widely
admired. The multi-party democratic institutions of the country were
seen as symbolic of the humane and progressive future that could be
enjoyed by southern Africa under majority rule.
The Botswana
have strong traditions of consensual government, as described in Democracy
in Botswana, published by the Botswana Society in 1988. The central
feature of the tradition was the kgotla, a meeting place where
public issues were discussed almost daily in the early mornings and late
afternoons. Other elements of the democratic tradition include
decentralization of government and the institutionalization of advisors
in the decision-making process of the chieftaincy. Perhaps as a result
of that tradition, and of the high quality of leadership the country has
enjoyed under Seretse Khama and his successor, President Quett Masire,
Botswana has enjoyed exceptional political stability since independence,
and has not resorted to coercion or repression. The country remains,
after a quarter century of self-government, an attractive model for
African development in terms of political freedom, civil rights, racial
tolerance, social justice and economic equity, and overall economic
growth.
These
qualities, and their manifestation just next door to South Africa, have
enabled Botswana to continue to receive generous foreign assistance
despite its own financial success. The country uses foreign aid very
well, and certainly continues to need both technical and educational
assistance as it strives to bring its people to modern levels of
productivity.
One of the
influential early donors was the Ford Foundation, whose representative
in Eastern Africa at the time was a personal friend of President Seretse
Khama. The Foundation provided residential staff in a number of key
positions, including advisors on staff development, education policy,
minerals policy, and finance and development planning. The Government
and the Foundation both recognized that the benefits of national
development could only be realized if the Government could use the
investment of revenues from mining elsewhere in the economy for the
population as a whole.
The Foundation
continued its technical assistance from 1969 to the late 1970s when, as
a matter of policy, it turned from the policy advisory field. At that
point, the resident economic advisor was Professor Stephen Lewis, who
convinced his colleagues at Williams College to set up a program for the
continued provision of technical assistance to Botswana, with funding
from various donors and the Government of Botswana itself. When Lewis
left Williams, the administration of the program moved to Toronto
University where it remains. Funding for the four senior advisors
currently resident in Botswana is now met by the Government alone.
The
Williams/Toronto program also covered training. For the last 20 years,
at least one participant from the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning has been in the Williams Masters program, geared to mid-career
officials from developing countries. The products of this training are
generally outstanding and set a high standard of performance for the
Ministry.
In addition to
the able advisors serving in policy-related positions in Botswana under
the Ford/Williams/Toronto program, the Government has had access to
advisory services and operational experts from other donors, including
AID. The ability to maintain high performance standards for its own
people, and to utilize foreign staff and advisors regardless of race to
fill gaps in locally available expertise, is one of the remarkable
characteristics of the policy process in Botswana.
A “Strategy
Review and Evaluation” of the USAID program in Botswana, conducted in
1987, found the monetary, fiscal and commodity-pricing policies of the
country to be generally sound, and excellent examples for developing
countries. The major policy problems it identified were the
comparatively high value of the pula, and a relatively high formal
sector wage rate; both factors contribute to high rates of unemployment
and underemployment. Apart from the dynamic minerals sector, and the
sectors benefiting from minerals (government, and wholesale and retail
trade), the economy was sluggish. Some of the disappointing performance
of the rest of the economy was, however, due to a prolonged drought,
which has since ended.
In recent years
Botswana has had some success in alleviating the impact of drought, and
in relieving the hardship of poor unemployed, underemployed and
unskilled workers through the provision of health and education
services. Economic diversification and development measures have also
made gains, but the basic problem of raising the earned incomes of
households through direct participation in productive processes remains.
C. STRUCTURE
OF ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING
1. Lead Role
of the MFDP
The Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) has been the lead ministry in
the country since the functions were combined in the early 1970s.
Planning officers in all major ministries, except for Agriculture, are
professionally responsible to the MFDP, and membership in the elite
corps of planners is seen as a route to advancement to senior posts
throughout the Government.
A number of
current ministers and permanent secretaries were planning officers
earlier in their careers. President Masire was formerly Minister of
Finance and Development Planning. The Permanent Secretary of MFDP is a
powerful force in Government, and one of the most able civil servants
anywhere in Africa or beyond.
2. Policy
Formation
The policy
process in Botswana is a complex affair, highly participative and
consultative, but engaging technical expertise at appropriate points in
the approval process. The process generally originates in one of the
ministries, where staff draw up a draft policy statement and circulate
it to all other ministries with a stake in the issues involved.
After
consultation with these ministries, and revision of the draft to reflect
the various opinions, the policy paper goes to the Economic Committee at
cabinet level. On this Committee are all Permanent Secretaries, plus the
Attorney General, the Governor of the Central Bank and the heads of the
police and army. This is not a decision-making body, only an advisory
one, but it helps the initiators of the policy paper to gain a sense of
opinions from other quarters.
After a second
revision, the originating ministry submits the policy paper to the
Cabinet for debate and approval. Once approval is gained, a White Paper
containing the Government’s views is tabled before the Parliament for
debate and approval or amendment. If approved, the policy becomes
official.
3. Rural
Development Policies
The process
varies somewhat when the issues concern rural development or labor
issues. Rural development policy formation engages the citizens at the
local level through Village Development Committees (VDCs). Village and
district representatives of Government ministries sit on VDCs with local
people, and discuss policy proposals originating locally or from some
other source. The recommendations of VDCs are discussed at the District
level, and then in the Rural Development Council, composed of Cabinet
Secretaries and chaired by the MFDP. The Council has a secretariat
staffed by the MFDP, and subcommittees from various ministries, to
consider key policy issues such as food strategy.
4.
Employment and Incomes Policies
In the labor
field, the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC) was
created in 1972 to produce a general policy on incomes, employment,
prices and profits. Membership on NEMIC consists of the Permanent
Secretaries of six ministries and representatives of the employers group
(BOCCIM) and of the 13 trade unions. NEMIC has subcommittees on manpower
(training), incomes, wages, prices, taxes, and profits.
MFDP provides
the secretariat for NEMIC, as it does the Rural Development Council.
This could lead to strong MFDP influence on the recommendations of
NEMIC, but we were assured that no pressures are applied to the members
of the secretariat to make NEMIC views conform to preconceived policy
preferences of the Ministry.
NEMIC took two
years to devise an initial employment policy, from 1972-1974. Its work
was inspired by the adverse impact of mineral wealth on the social
fabric in Liberia and Zambia, two African cases the Botswana Government
was determined not to emulate. In those countries, a highly-paid and
privileged segment of the labor force flourished in the mining sector,
but the rest of the country stagnated. Botswana was determined to use
the mineral wealth to benefit the entire population, and to avoid
inflating salaries to the point that no local products other than
minerals were competitive on the world market.
The employment
policies were revised in 1976, and reviewed extensively beginning in
1982. A team consisting of a British economist and a local consultant
studied the incomes policy, the Institute of Development Management (IDM)
reviewed prices, an ILO/SADCC team reviewed the minimum wage, and NEMIC
staff scrutinized expatriate compensation levels. The Government did not
accept the studies of prices and expatriate compensation, but the
minimum wage and incomes policy studies led to policy revisions in 1985.
In 1988,
another full policy review was initiated, this time with a Presidential
Commission overseeing the process. NEMIC again provided the secretariat
to the Commission, which is composed of Government staff and
consultants, and university people. A number of studies have been
commissioned, to be undertaken by university faculty members, the
National Institute for Research, and outside consultants. At the
culmination of the process, the MFDP will take into account the
recommendations of the Presidential Commission and NEMIC, and then make
its own recommendations to the Cabinet. A White Paper on Incomes Policy
based on the recommendations of the Commission was presented to
Parliament in August 1990.
Through this
process, Government attempts to set wage and incomes standards for the
entire economy: it determines minimum wages, sets Government salary
scales, and expects the private sector to follow Government’s example.
This process places NEMIC at the forefront in trying to resist the
escalation of wages over opportunity costs and the subsequent pricing of
Botswana’s products out of the international market.
Success in this
endeavor is mixed. Botswana has successfully avoided many of the
excesses to which mineral-exporting countries often succumb, such as
construction of showcase projects, inflationary spending, building
tariff walls to protect inefficient industries, and providing subsidies
to achieve social or economic objectives. (A Financial Assistance
Program (FAP) does subsidize labor in new industries, but this type of
subsidy under Botswana’s conditions contributes to the efficient use
of resources.)
Gradually,
however, Government expenditures and wage increases have put pressure on
prices, and may account for much of the difficulty Botswana has in
increasing non-mineral exports. It is hard to resist increasing
expenditures and wages when revenues triple expectations, as has
happened in the current National Development Plan.
At the lower
end, minimum wages may be 50 to 100 percent higher than their
opportunity cost. The Labor Force Survey issued by NEMIC for 1984-85
reports an overall unemployment rate of 25.3 percent, with a further 16
percent underemployed. At the upper end, however, the Government has
held the line against raising the wages of citizens to equal those of
expatriates, despite comparable abilities.
5. Other
Policy Mechanisms
In addition to
the RDC and NEMIC, other bodies participate in the formation of policies
in special fields. A Tax Review Committee, for example, consists of
heads of MFDP Macro and Finance Divisions, the Taxation Department,
Customs and Excise, the Tax Advisor, and the Attorney General. Also,
Consultative Committees with interdepartmental and interministerial
memberships review interest and exchange rate policies, banking
regulations, and mineral policies.
In keeping with
the kgotla tradition, public fora are often held on major issues.
500 people, ranging from farmers to university people, attended a
four-day conference on agricultural policy, for example. Similar
meetings are held on housing and population policies in order to inform
and learn from the interested public.
One of the more
notable public occasions in recent years was a two-day meeting on
Private Sector Development held in Francistown in 1988. Sponsored by the
Government and BOCCIM, the employers’ organization, the meeting had
financial backing and participation from USAID. Constraints to more
rapid private-sector development were freely discussed in an attempt to
foster a policy environment more conducive to private development.
The openness
with which policy issues can be discussed in Botswana, not only in
economic fields but in political areas as well, was exemplified at a
symposium on democracy held in Gabarone in August, 1988, culminating in
a University of Botswana research project. The traditions and practices
of democracy in Botswana were critically examined and compared with
Greek, Roman, French and American democratic experience, as well as with
one-party examples from modern Africa.
D. SOURCES
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT
The University
of Botswana is not yet a major source of policy-oriented research and
consultations. The Economics Department has eleven posts, but only seven
are currently filled. Of those, only two are Botswana, and only two of
the five expatriates have doctoral degrees. Botswana has had no brain
drain problem, but the University has not held strong attractions for
those qualified to enter the Economics Cadre.
The University
is dedicated to supporting the development process to the extent that it
can. Its development plan is geared to the national planning process,
and the committee designing the University’s role in National
Development Plan 7, to be launched in 1991, includes members from the
MFDP, the Ministry of Education, and the Department of Public Service
Management.
A National
Institute of Research and Documentation (NIR) was established at the
University in 1975. Its research agenda has a rural development cast
focusing on:
·
the environment,
·
education and society,
·
health and nutrition, and
·
migration, settlement, trade, and labor studies.
Professor
Thomas Tlou, the Vice-Chancellor, encourages consultancies by faculty
members and believes they will increase in number once the staffing
situation stabilizes. For the past year, the University has been unable
to attract a senior person to head the economics department, despite the
willingness of the British Government to top up the salary.
As Botswana
does not have substantial private consulting capacity in economic policy
fields, the Government meets most of its needs through foreign
assistance or through the Williams/ Toronto program. Experienced
development economists serving as advisors in MFDP in effect substitute
for local economic research and consulting capacity. In the long run,
Botswana will want its own research capacity, but until now the ability
of the Government to afford and to attract high-quality advisors appears
to have served it well.
E. NUMBER
AND QUALITY OF TRAINED ANALYSTS AVAILABLE
The public
service has in the past hired all graduates of the University, with the
MFDP taking first pick of those with degrees in economics and
statistics. Now, the Government has agreed to requests from the private
sector, through NEMIC, to share university output; graduates are
allocated by the DPSM, one third to local government, one third to
central government, and one third to parastatals and private industry.
The preference of graduates for placement among these sectors is taken
into account, but in the final analysis they are bonded to stay wherever
they are placed for five years as a condition of their scholarships. (DeBeers
Deptwana sponsors its own students at the University, thus avoiding the
allocation system.)
The Report of
the Presidential Commission on employment and incomes policy may
recommend the abolition of the bonding system, allowing graduates to
compete for jobs, but that has not yet been determined. Another rumored
recommendation affecting the supply of future analysts is a reversal of
an earlier decision to evaluate positions primarily on the basis of
supervisory responsibilities, which put professionals at a disadvantage.
Candidates
selected into the Economist Cadre, which includes all economists in the
public service except agricultural economists, must have a good first
degree (first or second class honors) in economics. Once accepted, they
are eligible for advanced training abroad, normally for a master’s
degree, after two or three years of satisfactory service. Members of the
Economist Cadre normally receive advanced training at Williams, Sussex,
Bradford and Toronto.
The Economist
Cadre is headed by the Director of Economic Affairs, the second-ranking
civil servant in the MFDP after the Permanent Secretary. Its members may
be assigned to posts in the MFDP, to planning offices in any Ministry
save Agriculture, or to economist positions in local government. The
planning officer’s day-to-day responsibility is to the Ministry to
which he or she is assigned, but he or she remains under the
professional supervision of the Director of Economic Affairs.
There are other
Cadres in the public service, such as the Personnel Officer Cadre, the
Financial Officer Cadre, and, on a larger scale, the Unified Local
Government Service and the Unified Teaching Service. The Economist and
Financial Officer Cadres seem to constitute a fast track in the public
service, reflecting the leading role of the Ministry to which they
belong.
One potential
drawback of this system is the absence of specialization within the
field of economics. At some point soon, Botswana may wish to develop
education economists, transport economists or natural resource
economists, rather than use general development economists to serve the
planning needs of those sectors. This type of specialization will become
particularly appropriate when the Government begins sending its officers
for doctoral training abroad, an option currently being considered. So
far, however, the Economist Cadre system seems to have served the
country well, creating a group of highly able people with common
standards.
Only recently
has this elite group begun to suffer defections. In one month, four
young officers resigned to accept positions in the private sector or
with parastatals. Although the Government is in favor of expanding the
private sector, these departures were clearly of concern to the
Permanent Secretary and others on his staff. The reasons the four
departed reportedly had to do with entry-level salaries, which are lower
for Government than for the parastatals and the private sector, and the
ready availability of housing provided by parastatals. One can expect to
be allocated a house within three months of joining the Botswana
Development Corporation, whereas it may take up to ten years to receive
one in Government service. Private housing is very expensive and
generally of low quality, which places a premium on the housing
perquisite.
The number of
trained and experienced Botswana analysts continues to increase, but so
does the demand for analytical services. The Permanent Secretary of
MFDP, Mr. Baledzi Gaolathe, said that the percentage of Economist Cadre
posts filled by expatriates has declined, but their actual number has
grown because of increased overall demand. Expatriate planning officers
are not considered to be advisors; their job descriptions are exactly
the same as their local counterparts, except that they have a special
responsibility to pass on their skills to their local colleagues. At the
present time, eight expatriates hold planning-officer positions, in
addition to the four expatriate advisors provided under the Williams/
Toronto program. (Two advisors are in MFDP, and one each in the Ministry
of Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.)
F. TRAINING
OPPORTUNITIES
1. Advanced
Degrees
The Government
has been able to send promising candidates abroad for advanced training,
in accordance with its staff development policy, after two or three
years’ service. Donor funding is sought where available, but Botswana
pays for the training if outside support is not available.
Botswana will
shortly need to begin sending people abroad for doctoral training. This
policy decision is already under consideration, and positive action may
be taken at any time. The best candidates for such training will
probably be found in the Economic or Financial Services. Their academic
potential can be judged from their success in their masters’ programs
and their performance on the job.
2.
In-service Training
Before and
after this formal training, members of the Economic Service are often
able to work with expatriate planning officers and consultants. This
kind of on-the-job experience is valuable and could be heightened by
giving more conscious attention to the tutorial dimension of the
expatriate’s job. Senior officers of the Ministry are understandably
seized with the importance of daily decision-making and consequently may
place higher value on the immediate professional output of experienced
staff than on their training responsibilities. Unless training receives
high priority, it is likely to give way to more immediate activities,
with the result that expatriate staff can inadvertently become obstacles
to the professional development of junior staff.
In the MFDP,
one of the outstanding young planning officers has in fact advanced very
rapidly up the career ladder, becoming senior planning officer only
three years after receiving a master’s degree. He benefited greatly
from working closely with an expatriate officer and a visiting
consultant, illustrating that in-service training and staff development
does occur. More could be done, however, internally in MFDP, to upgrade
the quantitative skills of junior staff and to use policy decision
memoranda for instructional purposes. Before policies have been
promulgated, the staff papers in which issues are debated must remain
confidential, but in later months or years the sensitivity of such
material could lessen while it retains its instructional value.
3.
University of Botswana
In NDP 7, the
University plans to launch graduate programs concentrating on fields
that contribute to development. These plans are not yet concrete. An
international commission headed by the former Vice-Chancellor of
Bradford University is scrutinizing the University with a ten-year time
perspective. Also, the Government will need to accept the plans of the
University before funding is likely to be forthcoming. The initiation of
a graduate program in economics would be a likely direction for
University expansion, but the prospect is dimmed by the current weakness
of undergraduate instruction in the field.
Professor Tlou,
the Vice-Chancellor, is aware that the economics department needs to be
strengthened. Improving the numbers and quality of economics graduates
is constrained both by the limited intake of qualified candidates from
the secondary schools and by the staff shortage in the department. The
secondary-school quality problem will be solved in time. Botswana has
largely achieved its objectives at the primary education level and is
shifting priority to the secondary level. The USAID Mission supports
quality improvement projects at both primary and secondary levels, both
very important targets for assistance. The shortage of qualified
university staff will not be solved internally in the foreseeable
future, and also requires donor attention.
4. Business
Education
Most officials
contacted in Government and the University believe a vigorous private
sector is essential to stimulate economic growth. Business education has
generally been neglected at the University, although a B. Commerce
degree is available.
Vice Chancellor
Tlou believes that a separate faculty should be established in the
University for business education. This would free the business
professors from some of the regulations of the Faculty of Social
Sciences and allow the Faculty to establish a separate character and
identity.
Mr. Richard N.
Mannathoko, Chairman of BOCCIM (the Botswana employers group) and a
successful business executive, expressed a similar sentiment concerning
the character of business education. He began our interview with the
statement “We don’t have the culture for this,” meaning private
enterprise. He explained that although Botswana can readily learn the
principles of business and entrepreneurship, their traditions do not
emphasize individuality and aggressive enterprise. The very
characteristics of the culture that lend themselves to democratic and
consultative forms of government may work against individual
self-reliant enterprise and risk-taking.
Mr. Mannathoko
also pointed out that the University has so far been used as an avenue
into Government employment. Since the style of teaching as well as the
subject matter reflect this intention, it has not been a fertile
breeding ground for indigenous entrepreneurs. A somewhat different
climate is required for dynamic business education.
The evaluators
of the Botswana Work Force and Skills Training Project (BWAST), also
identified cultural factors affecting the training of entrepreneurs:
“There is a cultural constraint on development prospects in
Botswana, and it is well-recognized. It is difficult to superimpose a
modern growth strategy on top of traditional -- in this case, largely
pastoral -- principles of commerce and of the necessary linkages between
rewards and performance. What some social anthropologists consider an
enlightened form of consensus decision-making is seen by employers as a
manifestation of risk avoidance and an unwillingness to accept
responsibility.” (p. 12)
The USAID
Mission in Botswana recognized the importance of business education
several years ago, and the BWAST project was administered flexibly in
order to encourage training for people in the private sector. The GMAT
for MBA programs is a difficult exam for most foreign students, and many
candidates from Botswana found themselves in MPA programs when their
GMAT scores failed to qualify them for business training.
G.
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Our overall
impressions of the ways in which the Government of Botswana formulates
policy are very positive. We are also very impressed with the USAID
relationship with the Government and the targeting of the assistance
funds available.
Perhaps the
most useful aspect of the visit for the purposes of this report is the
awareness Botswana gives one of the time it takes to design a
high-quality indigenous policy-making capability, and the limited
benefits that can be expected from improving the quality of
policy-making alone. Our observations can be summarized as follows:
1.
Botswana’s capacity for indigenous policy formation is limited by the
numbers of trained people available for employment.
Achieving
independence with a small population and a very low educational base,
Botswana has invested heavily in human resource development and is
making impressive progress in educating its people. Remarkably, the
Government has the self-confidence and wisdom to maintain high standards
in the development of its Economics Cadre, and to continue to rely upon
expatriate staff and advisors to fill positions.
2. Demand
for trained analysts in the Government is very high.
The supply
constraint could be eased somewhat over time by the following actions:
a.
Increasing and improving the output of the Economics Department
at the University of Botswana, strengthening the Department through
topping up salaries and providing logistical support for visiting
scholars and graduate students;
b.
Providing support for training abroad at the master’s and
doctoral levels. This sort of support is already part of the Mission’s
program, but we wish to support the idea. The Williams program has made
a very valuable contribution to the quality of the Economics Cadre, and
Botswana’s continued participation in it should be continued while
encouraging others to advance to PhD training.
c.
In-service training by advisors and opex staff should be given
higher priority. Instruction in quantitative methods and in policy
issues using actual position papers could be scheduled on a regular
basis.
d.
The employment of resident opex staff and advisors could be
gradually reduced by the use of former residents as short-term
consultants on a fairly regular basis. In this way, the involvement of
successful and knowledgeable people can be continued without blocking
avenues of promotion for indigenous staff. The tendency of senior
officials to rely upon expatriates would be lessened if they were only
available periodically.
3. The basic
problem of increasing employment and stimulating non-mineral-related
sectors of the economy will be little affected by efforts to indigenize
the policy process more rapidly, or to improve the quality of policies.
The stimulation
of indigenous entrepreneurship is a high-priority, but long-range,
activity for USAID and other donors. Start-up capital is said to be in
short supply, a condition that could be easily remedied, but cultural
factors affecting motivation may be more difficult to overcome. A
different environment from that currently prevailing at the University
may be conducive to business training. Possible AID responses to this
problem, in addition to the extensive work in the private enterprise
field already planned, include:
a.
Designing GMAT preparation courses for scholarship candidates,
including upgrading of quantitative skills;
b.
On a regional basis, helping to establish a first-rate business
school somewhere in English-speaking Africa.
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