AID and African Capacity Building: BOTSWANA. A Report for The Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development, September 1990

          Botswana seems at first to be a strange choice for a rapid assessment of deficiencies in policy-making capabilities in Africa. Its economy is growing at an enviable 12 percent per year, its policies are generally considered sound and enlightened, and its social, political and racial policies are held in high regard. It represents a “best case scenario,” a model of African development under nearly ideal political and economic conditions. Other countries on the continent, with less stable and enlightened policy environments and fewer resources with which to work, may see little incentive to adopt more sensible economic policies. The rewards for policy reform may be disappointing unless some explanation can be found for the lackluster performance of the non-mineral sectors of the Botswana economy.


Courtney A Nelson - Beirut 1973

Ras Shamra, Syria 1973


A. Introduction

B. Background

C. Structure of Economic Decision-Making

          1. Lead Role of the MFDP

          2. Policy Formation

          3. Rural Development Policies

          4. Employment and Incomes Policies

          5. Other Policy Mechanisms

D. Sources of Economic Analysis Outside of Government

E. Number and Quality of Trained Analysts Available

F. Training Opportunities

          1. Advanced Degrees

          2. In-service Training

          3. University of Botswana

          4. Business Education

G. Conclusions and Observations


          Botswana seems at first to be a strange choice for a rapid assessment of deficiencies in policy-making capabilities in Africa. Not only is the Botswana economy growing at an enviable rate, over 12 percent per year, but its policies governing the economy and the distribution of resources are generally considered to be sound and enlightened. The country’s social, political and racial policies are also held in high regard, an exceptional achievement for a country virtually surrounded by minority-ruled regimes at the time of its independence.

          In fact, it is the paradigmatic nature of Botswana’s economic and political systems that makes the country of unusual interest. It represents a “best case scenario,” a model of African development under nearly ideal political and economic conditions. Yet with all its favorable attributes and circumstances, if diamond exports were somehow removed from the economy while retaining the availability of capital they make possible, the growth rate of the economy has been estimated at between 4.0 and 4.7 percent per year. This is still very high, compared with most other African economies, but it is only around 1 percent more than the rate of natural increase, and hardly an abundant return on the sound policy environment that has been created.

          Looking at the Botswana experience, other countries on the continent, with less stable and enlightened policy environments and fewer resources with which to work, may find dim the prospects for rapidly emerging from their economic doldrums as a result of adopting more sensible economic policies. Unless some explanation can be found for the lackluster performance of the non-mineral sectors of the Botswana economy, the incentives for policy reform in other countries may be meager, and the rewards for policy reform may be disappointing.


          Setswana-speaking people settled the area now called Botswana in increasing numbers in the 19th Century, many of them refugees from the Zulu wars. In 1885, the British responded to requests from Botswana chiefs for assistance by declaring the area the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, but they exhibited little interest either in settling there themselves or in investing in the development of the indigenous people. It was assumed, at least until the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, that the territory would eventually join South Africa. Bechuanaland was actually governed by officials living outside its borders in Mafeking, South Africa.

          Only in the late 1950s, when eventual independence became likely, did the pace of development increase. By 1971, when the first census was taken, Botswana had a population of just over 630,000. Of the labor force, defined as everyone over ten years of age, 57 percent of the men were engaged in traditional agriculture, 10 percent in full-time wage employment, 13 percent combined agriculture and wage employment, and 20 percent, mostly school children and Bushmen, had no discernable economic activity. Only 3 percent of women over ten were in wage employment.

          Educational attainments at the time were modest. Only 2 percent of the population over 55 years had completed primary school or better, and even in the 25-40 age group the percentage was only 14. There were, however, 140 university graduates, slightly more than Tanzania, with 20 times the population, had at independence.

          The discovery of vast wealth in diamonds in 1969 came three years after independence; and in 1970 ninety percent of exports were still beef products. The country was attractive to the outside world, and to the donor community, mainly because of its precarious position as a majority-ruled poor country with South Africa, Southwest Africa, and Rhodesia as neighbors. The leadership of Seretse Khama, the first president, was widely admired. The multi-party democratic institutions of the country were seen as symbolic of the humane and progressive future that could be enjoyed by southern Africa under majority rule.

          The Botswana have strong traditions of consensual government, as described in Democracy in Botswana, published by the Botswana Society in 1988. The central feature of the tradition was the kgotla, a meeting place where public issues were discussed almost daily in the early mornings and late afternoons. Other elements of the democratic tradition include decentralization of government and the institutionalization of advisors in the decision-making process of the chieftaincy. Perhaps as a result of that tradition, and of the high quality of leadership the country has enjoyed under Seretse Khama and his successor, President Quett Masire, Botswana has enjoyed exceptional political stability since independence, and has not resorted to coercion or repression. The country remains, after a quarter century of self-government, an attractive model for African development in terms of political freedom, civil rights, racial tolerance, social justice and economic equity, and overall economic growth.

          These qualities, and their manifestation just next door to South Africa, have enabled Botswana to continue to receive generous foreign assistance despite its own financial success. The country uses foreign aid very well, and certainly continues to need both technical and educational assistance as it strives to bring its people to modern levels of productivity.

          One of the influential early donors was the Ford Foundation, whose representative in Eastern Africa at the time was a personal friend of President Seretse Khama. The Foundation provided residential staff in a number of key positions, including advisors on staff development, education policy, minerals policy, and finance and development planning. The Government and the Foundation both recognized that the benefits of national development could only be realized if the Government could use the investment of revenues from mining elsewhere in the economy for the population as a whole.

          The Foundation continued its technical assistance from 1969 to the late 1970s when, as a matter of policy, it turned from the policy advisory field. At that point, the resident economic advisor was Professor Stephen Lewis, who convinced his colleagues at Williams College to set up a program for the continued provision of technical assistance to Botswana, with funding from various donors and the Government of Botswana itself. When Lewis left Williams, the administration of the program moved to Toronto University where it remains. Funding for the four senior advisors currently resident in Botswana is now met by the Government alone.

          The Williams/Toronto program also covered training. For the last 20 years, at least one participant from the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning has been in the Williams Masters program, geared to mid-career officials from developing countries. The products of this training are generally outstanding and set a high standard of performance for the Ministry.

          In addition to the able advisors serving in policy-related positions in Botswana under the Ford/Williams/Toronto program, the Government has had access to advisory services and operational experts from other donors, including AID. The ability to maintain high performance standards for its own people, and to utilize foreign staff and advisors regardless of race to fill gaps in locally available expertise, is one of the remarkable characteristics of the policy process in Botswana.

          A “Strategy Review and Evaluation” of the USAID program in Botswana, conducted in 1987, found the monetary, fiscal and commodity-pricing policies of the country to be generally sound, and excellent examples for developing countries. The major policy problems it identified were the comparatively high value of the pula, and a relatively high formal sector wage rate; both factors contribute to high rates of unemployment and under­employment. Apart from the dynamic minerals sector, and the sectors benefiting from minerals (government, and wholesale and retail trade), the economy was sluggish. Some of the disappointing performance of the rest of the economy was, however, due to a prolonged drought, which has since ended.

          In recent years Botswana has had some success in alleviating the impact of drought, and in relieving the hardship of poor unemployed, underemployed and unskilled workers through the provision of health and education services. Economic diversification and development measures have also made gains, but the basic problem of raising the earned incomes of households through direct participation in productive processes remains.


1. Lead Role of the MFDP

          The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) has been the lead ministry in the country since the functions were combined in the early 1970s. Planning officers in all major ministries, except for Agriculture, are professionally responsible to the MFDP, and membership in the elite corps of planners is seen as a route to advancement to senior posts throughout the Government.

          A number of current ministers and permanent secretaries were planning officers earlier in their careers. President Masire was formerly Minister of Finance and Development Planning. The Permanent Secretary of MFDP is a powerful force in Government, and one of the most able civil servants anywhere in Africa or beyond.

2. Policy Formation

          The policy process in Botswana is a complex affair, highly participative and consultative, but engaging technical expertise at appropriate points in the approval process. The process generally originates in one of the ministries, where staff draw up a draft policy statement and circulate it to all other ministries with a stake in the issues involved.      

          After consultation with these ministries, and revision of the draft to reflect the various opinions, the policy paper goes to the Economic Committee at cabinet level. On this Committee are all Permanent Secretaries, plus the Attorney General, the Governor of the Central Bank and the heads of the police and army. This is not a decision-making body, only an advisory one, but it helps the initiators of the policy paper to gain a sense of opinions from other quarters.

          After a second revision, the originating ministry submits the policy paper to the Cabinet for debate and approval. Once approval is gained, a White Paper containing the Government’s views is tabled before the Parliament for debate and approval or amendment. If approved, the policy becomes official.

3. Rural Development Policies

          The process varies somewhat when the issues concern rural development or labor issues. Rural development policy formation engages the citizens at the local level through Village Development Committees (VDCs). Village and district representatives of Government ministries sit on VDCs with local people, and discuss policy proposals originating locally or from some other source. The recommendations of VDCs are discussed at the District level, and then in the Rural Development Council, composed of Cabinet Secretaries and chaired by the MFDP. The Council has a secretariat staffed by the MFDP, and subcommittees from various ministries, to consider key policy issues such as food strategy.

4. Employment and Incomes Policies

          In the labor field, the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC) was created in 1972 to produce a general policy on incomes, employment, prices and profits. Membership on NEMIC consists of the Permanent Secretaries of six ministries and representatives of the employers group (BOCCIM) and of the 13 trade unions. NEMIC has subcommittees on manpower (training), incomes, wages, prices, taxes, and profits.

          MFDP provides the secretariat for NEMIC, as it does the Rural Development Council. This could lead to strong MFDP influence on the recommendations of NEMIC, but we were assured that no pressures are applied to the members of the secretariat to make NEMIC views conform to preconceived policy preferences of the Ministry.

          NEMIC took two years to devise an initial employment policy, from 1972-1974. Its work was inspired by the adverse impact of mineral wealth on the social fabric in Liberia and Zambia, two African cases the Botswana Government was determined not to emulate. In those countries, a highly-paid and privileged segment of the labor force flourished in the mining sector, but the rest of the country stagnated. Botswana was determined to use the mineral wealth to benefit the entire population, and to avoid inflating salaries to the point that no local products other than minerals were competitive on the world market.

          The employment policies were revised in 1976, and reviewed extensively beginning in 1982. A team consisting of a British economist and a local consultant studied the incomes policy, the Institute of Development Management (IDM) reviewed prices, an ILO/SADCC team reviewed the minimum wage, and NEMIC staff scrutinized expatriate compensation levels. The Government did not accept the studies of prices and expatriate compensation, but the minimum wage and incomes policy studies led to policy revisions in 1985.

          In 1988, another full policy review was initiated, this time with a Presidential Commission overseeing the process. NEMIC again provided the secretariat to the Commission, which is composed of Government staff and consultants, and university people. A number of studies have been commissioned, to be undertaken by university faculty members, the National Institute for Research, and outside consultants. At the culmination of the process, the MFDP will take into account the recommendations of the Presidential Commission and NEMIC, and then make its own recommendations to the Cabinet. A White Paper on Incomes Policy based on the recommendations of the Commission was presented to Parliament in August 1990.

          Through this process, Government attempts to set wage and incomes standards for the entire economy: it determines minimum wages, sets Government salary scales, and expects the private sector to follow Government’s example. This process places NEMIC at the forefront in trying to resist the escalation of wages over opportunity costs and the subsequent pricing of Botswana’s products out of the international market.

          Success in this endeavor is mixed. Botswana has successfully avoided many of the excesses to which mineral-exporting countries often succumb, such as construction of showcase projects, inflationary spending, building tariff walls to protect inefficient industries, and providing subsidies to achieve social or economic objectives. (A Financial Assistance Program (FAP) does subsidize labor in new industries, but this type of subsidy under Botswana’s conditions contributes to the efficient use of resources.)

          Gradually, however, Government expenditures and wage increases have put pressure on prices, and may account for much of the difficulty Botswana has in increasing non-mi­neral exports. It is hard to resist increasing expenditures and wages when revenues triple expectations, as has happened in the current National Development Plan.

          At the lower end, minimum wages may be 50 to 100 percent higher than their opportunity cost. The Labor Force Survey issued by NEMIC for 1984-85 reports an overall unemployment rate of 25.3 percent, with a further 16 percent underemployed. At the upper end, however, the Government has held the line against raising the wages of citizens to equal those of expatriates, despite comparable abilities.

5. Other Policy Mechanisms

          In addition to the RDC and NEMIC, other bodies participate in the formation of policies in special fields. A Tax Review Committee, for example, consists of heads of MFDP Macro and Finance Divisions, the Taxation Department, Customs and Excise, the Tax Advisor, and the Attorney General. Also, Consultative Committees with interdepartmental and interministerial memberships review interest and exchange rate policies, banking regulations, and mineral policies.

          In keeping with the kgotla tradition, public fora are often held on major issues. 500 people, ranging from farmers to university people, attended a four-day conference on agricultural policy, for example. Similar meetings are held on housing and population policies in order to inform and learn from the interested public.

          One of the more notable public occasions in recent years was a two-day meeting on Private Sector Development held in Francistown in 1988. Sponsored by the Government and BOCCIM, the employers’ organization, the meeting had financial backing and participation from USAID. Constraints to more rapid private-sector development were freely discussed in an attempt to foster a policy environment more conducive to private development.

          The openness with which policy issues can be discussed in Botswana, not only in economic fields but in political areas as well, was exemplified at a symposium on democracy held in Gabarone in August, 1988, culminating in a University of Botswana research project. The traditions and practices of democracy in Botswana were critically examined and compared with Greek, Roman, French and American democratic experience, as well as with one-party examples from modern Africa.


          The University of Botswana is not yet a major source of policy-oriented research and consultations. The Economics Department has eleven posts, but only seven are currently filled. Of those, only two are Botswana, and only two of the five expatriates have doctoral degrees. Botswana has had no brain drain problem, but the University has not held strong attractions for those qualified to enter the Economics Cadre.

          The University is dedicated to supporting the development process to the extent that it can. Its development plan is geared to the national planning process, and the committee designing the University’s role in National Development Plan 7, to be launched in 1991, includes members from the MFDP, the Ministry of Education, and the Department of Public Service Management.

          A National Institute of Research and Documentation (NIR) was established at the University in 1975. Its research agenda has a rural development cast focusing on:

·         the environment,

·         education and society,

·         health and nutrition, and

·         migration, settlement, trade, and labor studies.

          Professor Thomas Tlou, the Vice-Chancellor, encourages consultancies by faculty members and believes they will increase in number once the staffing situation stabilizes. For the past year, the University has been unable to attract a senior person to head the economics department, despite the willingness of the British Government to top up the salary.

          As Botswana does not have substantial private consulting capacity in economic policy fields, the Government meets most of its needs through foreign assistance or through the Williams/ Toronto program. Experienced development economists serving as advisors in MFDP in effect substitute for local economic research and consulting capacity. In the long run, Botswana will want its own research capacity, but until now the ability of the Government to afford and to attract high-quality advisors appears to have served it well.


          The public service has in the past hired all graduates of the University, with the MFDP taking first pick of those with degrees in economics and statistics. Now, the Government has agreed to requests from the private sector, through NEMIC, to share university output; graduates are allocated by the DPSM, one third to local government, one third to central government, and one third to parastatals and private industry. The preference of graduates for placement among these sectors is taken into account, but in the final analysis they are bonded to stay wherever they are placed for five years as a condition of their scholarships. (DeBeers Deptwana sponsors its own students at the University, thus avoiding the allocation system.)

          The Report of the Presidential Commission on employment and incomes policy may recommend the abolition of the bonding system, allowing graduates to compete for jobs, but that has not yet been determined. Another rumored recommendation affecting the supply of future analysts is a reversal of an earlier decision to evaluate positions primarily on the basis of supervisory responsibilities, which put professionals at a disadvantage.

          Candidates selected into the Economist Cadre, which includes all economists in the public service except agricultural economists, must have a good first degree (first or second class honors) in economics. Once accepted, they are eligible for advanced training abroad, normally for a master’s degree, after two or three years of satisfactory service. Members of the Economist Cadre normally receive advanced training at Williams, Sussex, Bradford and Toronto.

          The Economist Cadre is headed by the Director of Economic Affairs, the second-ranking civil servant in the MFDP after the Permanent Secretary. Its members may be assigned to posts in the MFDP, to planning offices in any Ministry save Agriculture, or to economist positions in local government. The planning officer’s day-to-day responsibility is to the Ministry to which he or she is assigned, but he or she remains under the professional supervision of the Director of Economic Affairs.

          There are other Cadres in the public service, such as the Personnel Officer Cadre, the Financial Officer Cadre, and, on a larger scale, the Unified Local Government Service and the Unified Teaching Service. The Economist and Financial Officer Cadres seem to constitute a fast track in the public service, reflecting the leading role of the Ministry to which they belong.

          One potential drawback of this system is the absence of specialization within the field of economics. At some point soon, Botswana may wish to develop education economists, transport economists or natural resource economists, rather than use general development economists to serve the planning needs of those sectors. This type of specialization will become particularly appropriate when the Government begins sending its officers for doctoral training abroad, an option currently being considered. So far, however, the Economist Cadre system seems to have served the country well, creating a group of highly able people with common standards.

          Only recently has this elite group begun to suffer defections. In one month, four young officers resigned to accept positions in the private sector or with parastatals. Although the Government is in favor of expanding the private sector, these departures were clearly of concern to the Permanent Secretary and others on his staff. The reasons the four departed reportedly had to do with entry-level salaries, which are lower for Government than for the parastatals and the private sector, and the ready availability of housing provided by parastatals. One can expect to be allocated a house within three months of joining the Botswana Development Corporation, whereas it may take up to ten years to receive one in Government service. Private housing is very expensive and generally of low quality, which places a premium on the housing perquisite.

          The number of trained and experienced Botswana analysts continues to increase, but so does the demand for analytical services. The Permanent Secretary of MFDP, Mr. Baledzi Gaolathe, said that the percentage of Economist Cadre posts filled by expatriates has declined, but their actual number has grown because of increased overall demand. Expatriate planning officers are not considered to be advisors; their job descriptions are exactly the same as their local counterparts, except that they have a special responsibility to pass on their skills to their local colleagues. At the present time, eight expatriates hold planning-officer positions, in addition to the four expatriate advisors provided under the Williams/ Toronto program. (Two advisors are in MFDP, and one each in the Ministry of Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.)


1. Advanced Degrees

          The Government has been able to send promising candidates abroad for advanced training, in accordance with its staff development policy, after two or three years’ service. Donor funding is sought where available, but Botswana pays for the training if outside support is not available.

          Botswana will shortly need to begin sending people abroad for doctoral training. This policy decision is already under consideration, and positive action may be taken at any time. The best candidates for such training will probably be found in the Economic or Financial Services. Their academic potential can be judged from their success in their masters’ programs and their performance on the job.

2. In-service Training

          Before and after this formal training, members of the Economic Service are often able to work with expatriate planning officers and consultants. This kind of on-the-job experience is valuable and could be heightened by giving more conscious attention to the tutorial dimension of the expatriate’s job. Senior officers of the Ministry are understandably seized with the importance of daily decision-making and consequently may place higher value on the immediate professional output of experienced staff than on their training responsibilities. Unless training receives high priority, it is likely to give way to more immediate activities, with the result that expatriate staff can inadvertently become obstacles to the professional development of junior staff.

          In the MFDP, one of the outstanding young planning officers has in fact advanced very rapidly up the career ladder, becoming senior planning officer only three years after receiving a master’s degree. He benefited greatly from working closely with an expatriate officer and a visiting consultant, illustrating that in-service training and staff development does occur. More could be done, however, internally in MFDP, to upgrade the quantitative skills of junior staff and to use policy decision memoranda for instructional purposes. Before policies have been promulgated, the staff papers in which issues are debated must remain confidential, but in later months or years the sensitivity of such material could lessen while it retains its instructional value.

3. University of Botswana

          In NDP 7, the University plans to launch graduate programs concentrating on fields that contribute to development. These plans are not yet concrete. An international commission headed by the former Vice-Chancellor of Bradford University is scrutinizing the University with a ten-year time perspective. Also, the Government will need to accept the plans of the University before funding is likely to be forthcoming. The initiation of a graduate program in economics would be a likely direction for University expansion, but the prospect is dimmed by the current weakness of undergraduate instruction in the field.

          Professor Tlou, the Vice-Chancellor, is aware that the economics department needs to be strengthened. Improving the numbers and quality of economics graduates is constrained both by the limited intake of qualified candidates from the secondary schools and by the staff shortage in the department. The secondary-school quality problem will be solved in time. Botswana has largely achieved its objectives at the primary education level and is shifting priority to the secondary level. The USAID Mission supports quality improvement projects at both primary and secondary levels, both very important targets for assistance. The shortage of qualified university staff will not be solved internally in the foreseeable future, and also requires donor attention.

4. Business Education

          Most officials contacted in Government and the University believe a vigorous private sector is essential to stimulate economic growth. Business education has generally been neglected at the University, although a B. Commerce degree is available.

          Vice Chancellor Tlou believes that a separate faculty should be established in the University for business education. This would free the business professors from some of the regulations of the Faculty of Social Sciences and allow the Faculty to establish a separate character and identity.

          Mr. Richard N. Mannathoko, Chairman of BOCCIM (the Botswana employers group) and a successful business executive, expressed a similar sentiment concerning the character of business education. He began our interview with the statement “We don’t have the culture for this,” meaning private enterprise. He explained that although Botswana can readily learn the principles of business and entrepreneurship, their traditions do not emphasize individuality and aggressive enterprise. The very characteristics of the culture that lend themselves to democratic and consultative forms of government may work against individual self-reliant enterprise and risk-taking.

          Mr. Mannathoko also pointed out that the University has so far been used as an avenue into Government employment. Since the style of teaching as well as the subject matter reflect this intention, it has not been a fertile breeding ground for indigenous entrepreneurs. A somewhat different climate is required for dynamic business education.

          The evaluators of the Botswana Work Force and Skills Training Project (BWAST), also identified cultural factors affecting the training of entrepreneurs:

    “There is a cultural constraint on development prospects in Botswana, and it is well-recognized. It is difficult to superimpose a modern growth strategy on top of traditional -- in this case, largely pastoral -- principles of commerce and of the necessary linkages between rewards and performance. What some social anthropologists consider an enlightened form of consensus decision-making is seen by employers as a manifestation of risk avoidance and an unwillingness to accept responsibility.” (p. 12)

          The USAID Mission in Botswana recognized the importance of business education several years ago, and the BWAST project was administered flexibly in order to encourage training for people in the private sector. The GMAT for MBA programs is a difficult exam for most foreign students, and many candidates from Botswana found themselves in MPA programs when their GMAT scores failed to qualify them for business training.


          Our overall impressions of the ways in which the Government of Botswana formulates policy are very positive. We are also very impressed with the USAID relationship with the Government and the targeting of the assistance funds available.

          Perhaps the most useful aspect of the visit for the purposes of this report is the awareness Botswana gives one of the time it takes to design a high-quality indigenous policy-making capability, and the limited benefits that can be expected from improving the quality of policy-making alone. Our observations can be summarized as follows:

1. Botswana’s capacity for indigenous policy formation is limited by the numbers of trained people available for employment.

          Achieving independence with a small population and a very low educational base, Botswana has invested heavily in human resource development and is making impressive progress in educating its people. Remarkably, the Government has the self-confidence and wisdom to maintain high standards in the development of its Economics Cadre, and to continue to rely upon expatriate staff and advisors to fill positions.

2. Demand for trained analysts in the Government is very high.

          The supply constraint could be eased somewhat over time by the following actions:

a.      Increasing and improving the output of the Economics Department at the University of Botswana, strengthening the Department through topping up salaries and providing logistical support for visiting scholars and graduate students;

b.      Providing support for training abroad at the master’s and doctoral levels. This sort of support is already part of the Mission’s program, but we wish to support the idea. The Williams program has made a very valuable contribution to the quality of the Economics Cadre, and Botswana’s continued participation in it should be continued while encouraging others to advance to PhD training.

c.      In-service training by advisors and opex staff should be given higher priority. Instruction in quantitative methods and in policy issues using actual position papers could be scheduled on a regular basis.

d.      The employment of resident opex staff and advisors could be gradually reduced by the use of former residents as short-term consultants on a fairly regular basis. In this way, the involvement of successful and knowledgeable people can be continued without blocking avenues of promotion for indigenous staff. The tendency of senior officials to rely upon expatriates would be lessened if they were only available periodically.

3. The basic problem of increasing employment and stimulating non-mineral-related sectors of the economy will be little affected by efforts to indigenize the policy process more rapidly, or to improve the quality of policies.

          The stimulation of indigenous entrepreneurship is a high-priority, but long-range, activity for USAID and other donors. Start-up capital is said to be in short supply, a condition that could be easily remedied, but cultural factors affecting motivation may be more difficult to overcome. A different environment from that currently prevailing at the University may be conducive to business training. Possible AID responses to this problem, in addition to the extensive work in the private enterprise field already planned, include:

a.      Designing GMAT preparation courses for scholarship candidates, including upgrading of quantitative skills;

b.      On a regional basis, helping to establish a first-rate business school somewhere in English-speaking Africa. 

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