Administration and Economic Planning in Eastern Africa: A Ford Foundation Program Evaluation   1977                                                              part 6 of 8

C. 3. Public Administration in Tanzania and Kenya 

C. 3. a. Outcomes  

          It may be useful to consider program outcomes in the public administration field in Tanzania and Kenya simultaneously. Despite differences in the initial size and level of Africanization of the two civil services, they have encountered such similar problems that it is instructive to contrast each Government’s responses to some of them. 

We have seen that the first order of business for both governments after independence was to gain meaningful control over their societies by replacing Europeans and Asians in the civil service with qualified Africans as quickly as possible. The two governments approached this problem in very much the same fashion, doubtless because their principal advisor on the process was the same man, David Anderson. The same set of tools was employed in both countries, i.e., inventorying key posts and scheduling replacements, manpower planning, manpower utilization, and sharpening the focus of educational and training institutions. Tanzania, starting from a point well behind Kenya in the supply of trained manpower, pursued these policies and programs with more vigor and determination than Kenya, but both were serious about the need to take command of their governments and both were successful in doing so earlier than most observers on Independence Day would have thought likely. 

It seems to me that in assisting these governments with a liberal supply of the best advisors whom we or they could identify, the Foundation performed a very considerable service in a situation charged with the kind of emotion it is difficult now to recall. 

The job was first of all to help find and train the people to move into the shoes of the departing expatriates. Once that was underway the task quickly broadened to include the creation of new institutions and processes for spreading the benefits of independence more broadly through the population of each country. This task required a good deal of ingenuity as well as careful planning. The staff development advisor, with his colleagues, was central to the process. They did not design the technical programs for spreading credit, education, and technical knowledge in these countries, but they were often called upon for assistance in organizing the institutions, designing appropriate training programs, and integrating the new instrumentalities with the rest of government. 

Testimony to the effectiveness of these efforts is found in both countries, where the functions of many of the advisors have become institutionalized. Tanzania now has a Ministry of Manpower Development. In addition to its manpower planning function, it has a Manpower Services Division charged with many of the tasks of the old manpower utilization advisors, and a Personnel Policy Division that deals with much of the load formerly shouldered by staff development advisors. 

In Kenya, the Director of Personnel, J. Gethenge, credits Anderson with making a real breakthrough by enabling the Government to consider Africanization on a post-by-post basis. There, too, the Management Services Unit thrives, despite the misgivings of its designer, Warren Irons: a computerized personnel roster remains valuable, and a Staff Development Unit continues to assist ministries to work out their training programs. Gethenge does feel, however, that the Foundation left the administrative improvement field too soon, and too abruptly. Although long-term advisors are no longer required, he would like to be able to rely on the Foundation for ad hoc support for particular cases, such as specialized training needs, which occasionally arise. A similar case was made by Mr. Mwasongwe, Director of Training and Manpower Allocation, in Dar es Salaam. 

Gethenge also made the point that in his view the Foundation should have done more on administrative training. Formal efforts along this line have been confined to the construction of the CSTC in Dar es Salaam, and later the provision of five man-years of staff time to the Kenya Institute of Administration. The British Government and AID had in our view provided adequately for KIA’s staff and financial needs, and while we may have been tempted to become more involved in the East African Staff College on senior-level administrative training, a viable opportunity did not arise. Nor was the Foundation anxious to participate in relatively routine training programs. A trainer cost the Foundation as much per year as an advisor, and it seemed then as it does now that the recruitment of highly-qualified administrative advisors was a better use of funds. 

KIA and the Staff College have come under attack recently from a group of British scholars. Bernard Schaffer et al (1974) have made a rather elaborate case that the colonial officers in East Africa, once they had accepted the fact of approaching independence, made a belated but determined effort to train African officers who would behave as much like their tutors as possible, thus preserving the system. By replicating themselves as closely as possible, and avoiding a radical change in the system after independence, employment prospects would presumably remain good long after independence had been achieved, because of the time it would take to produce sufficient numbers of generalists of the high standard demanded by the system. The argument is also related to the thesis advanced by Cohn Leys (1974), who is one of the contributors to Schaffer’s book, that the preservation of the system and the gradual replacement of expatriates by an African “comprador-bourgeoisie” made possible the continued exploitation of Kenya by world capitalism. Co-optation is a word frequently employed to describe what happened to the Africans who received the training. 

I confess to some bafflement about this line of thinking. It seems to be a minor skirmish in the continuing class struggle between scholars and civil servants. Certainly the colonial governments sought to leave their system intact if possible, just as they left parliaments scattered around the world, but their motives can in my opinion be put down to a desire to preserve what they conceived to be the finest institutions for the purpose of governance. 

Another criticism of foreign-aided training programs of the era, one with less sinister connotations, is that they were unimaginative. It is easier to be in sympathy with this charge, yet I’m not convinced that real change can or should originate in training programs, or that those running the programs could have been expected to know in what directions change would take place. Although there is much truth made in the point by John Malecela in Arusha that one can’t build an African house on the European foundations left by the departing colonists, it should be recalled that (a) there was no alternative African system available at the time for managing a national government, and (b) the new governments did depart briskly from their inherited institutional pattern by introducing greatly expanded government services for consumption and development purposes. 

Although the public administration program must be considered an impressive achievement in both countries, two major areas of difficulty still inhibit the effectiveness of public service. The Foundation has not focused seriously on these problems, not because they were unrecognized, but because they were unwieldy. They are the problems first of motivation and morale, and second of local government and rural development. 

C. 3. b. Motivation and Morale 

Fairly early in his East African career, David Anderson observed that, “while we have been fairly successful in inducing specific skills for specific functions and thus meeting the immediate need, we have not yet solved the longer-range problem of producing a self-developing career civil servant. This is partly a question of motivation and ethics on which we need some more research.” (Anderson 1966) 

This question of performance and motivation occupied the minds of many people in the mid-1960s but no research program emerged from the incubation. A Foundation administrative specialist in 1969 made one proposal to study the aspira­tions and motives of the work force, so that an incentive system could be devised which catered to real wants and needs, but this idea was stillborn. One can only guess at some of the reasons for the Foundation’s inaction. The chief one I believe was the unpopularity of the subject among many of the civil servants with whom we were working. Job performance and motivation were not universally recognized to be problems and one ran the risk of being thought offensive if one pursued the subject with conviction. 

Training institutions did of course try to instill productive job attitudes in their students, but the need for achievement apparently failed to survive the transition from training to the job. 

At a Foundation conference in Dar es Salaam in 1973, B. A. N. Collins cited a study that found that good relations with the boss, high salary, and security were valued more highly by Kenyan civil servants than challenge or a sense of achievement in a job. Also, better qualified people were more easily dissatisfied than less qualified, and authoritarian patterns of management were prevalent but resented. (Collins 1973) 

Both Tanzania and Kenya set down codes of ethics for their civil servants before the end of the decade of the 1960s, and here the difference in approach to a problem is revealing.  

President Nyerere in the Arusha Declaration devoted an extensive section to what he called “qualifications for leadership.”  There is some evidence that this section of the paper was more important to him than the self-reliance doctrine, which involved the nationalization of a number of enterprises. His concern over leadership qualifications had more to do with the danger of the emergence of a ruling class in the Party and the Government than with productivity, and he consequently sought to motivate his people through ideology rather than material reward. The Declaration contained a set of severe restrictions on the uses of influence and private wealth. No leader, government minister, or civil servant down to the middle rank could in any way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism; that is, none should hold directorships in private companies, have two or more salaries, or own houses rented to others. 

Typically, Kenya approached the motivation question more slowly, more pragmatically, and more methodically. In May 1971, a report issued by Duncan N. Ndegwa, Chairman of the Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission, proposed a code of ethics for civil servants. The most striking feature of the code was that under certain conditions it permitted civil servants to own and participate in private businesses. The Commission reasoned that the private sector, which Government relied upon for the major effort in Kenya’s economic development, was able to pay salary scales much higher than those of Government. If the public sector were to follow suit, the serious gap already existing between the poor of Kenya and the members of the public service would increase, and scarce resources would be diverted from investment to consumption. On the other hand, if no attempt were made to recognize the differential between public service and private industry remuneration, Government could expect to lose its most able servants. 

These two policy declarations have been immensely important in setting the tone and style of government in Tanzania and Kenya. Tanzania’s strict rules have, one gathers, been firmly enforced; and Kenya’s civil servants have lost no time in making use of the opportunities their code permitted them. Although one must rely here only on anecdotal evidence, it appears that both civil services have declined in effectiveness since the declarations were made. It may be incorrect to attribute this decline to the statements themselves, as many do, because the decline began before the policies were announced. It would seem more reasonable to attribute the deterioration of these services to the gradual erosion of what Goren Hyden calls “the administrative culture.” This term implies that a bureaucracy embodies a set of professional ethics consistent with the private ethics of the people who devised it, and who in most cases continue to run it. In East Africa, following Africanization, the public ethics required by Anglo-Saxon style institutions may have been divergent from the private ethics of the individuals who now run the system. 

One example of this divergence is the apparently inherent difficulty of assigning individual responsibility for performance. A senior expatriate, who had worked closely with a number of ministers in President Nyerere’s Government, remarked to me that the quality of the ministers he knew was extraordinarily high in terms of their abilities, determination, and integrity. They were not, however, able to exact comparably high-level performance from their subordinates at the middle or lower levels. One reason for this was their reluctance to attempt to assign individual blame. If something was not done which should have been, they would not seek to identify the person in whom the fault lay. Consequently, the men at the top were extremely dedicated and hard working, but they received weak performances from their supporting staffs. 

I pursued this topic in conversations in Kenya and found much the same story. Although the Ndegwa Commission led to the adoption of performance appraisals in the civil service, they are not in fact much used. One reason for this is that when a superior criticizes a subordinate, and that person happens to be from a different tribe, the criticism is often taken as an ethnic slur. I was told that there have been cases of Members of Parliament rising to denounce civil servants who had criticized a fellow tribesman. This reluctance to assign individual blame or responsibility may go even deeper into the culture than the level of tribal competition. In any case, it is deeply rooted in custom and ethics and it deprives the bureaucracy of one of its most important formal sanctions on behavior. 

Other cases could be cited where there is a contradiction between private ethics and the ethics of the system, but it may be more useful to turn to a contradiction between the new national ethics and the ethics of the bureaucratic system. A number of observers, including Cohn Leys, have noted that the administrative, executive and clerical grades of the colonial civil service conformed racially to European, Asian and African occupations. Since independence, the racial barriers have disappeared for Africans, but the layering of the system remains, and promotion from executive grades to administrative grades, for example, is uncommon. This is widely regarded as fostering the growth of a class system in African society, contrary to proclaimed ethics of the governments.   

C. 3. c. Local Government and Rural Development  

The Foundation refrained from engaging directly in the complex problems of local government, despite the strong belief by David Anderson and Frank Sutton that the effectiveness of administration at the local levels was of the utmost importance. This trepidation was based largely on considerations of scale. The number of administrative units and the number of people manning them made the problem awkward for an agency the size of the Foundation. It was hard to see where the addition of a few high-quality advisors or a grant for a single training center would make much difference to the total picture. 

Local government problems could not be ignored by the central governments of Tanzania and Kenya, however; and it is notable that around 1969 both found district level performance so inadequate that they felt forced to centralize a number of revenue collection and payment functions previously left to the districts. This gathering-in of powers was done reluctantly in both cases; it ran counter to President Nyerere’s expressed intention to decentralize power and to Kenya’s concurrent attempt to institute provincial and district-level planning. 

Neither Government gave up its intention to decentralize functions, but again the Kenyan response was slower and more methodical, while the Tanzanian response was to make a “great leap forward.”  The Tanzanian decentralization of 1972 constituted the great leap. 

The literature on local government and rural development in East Africa is extensive. The picture is too complex to receive justice in this account, but some observations from Philip Mbithi, James Finucane, Jon Moris, and Robert Chambers may be noted. 

Local government suffers from all the problems of motivation and morale of central government, but these are compounded by the factors of distance and isolation. Communication is of tremendous importance, particularly when power and authority are heavily vested in the ministries in the capital city. There is a tendency for one-way communication, from the top down, to predominate in these systems, for a number of reasons. These include the habit of authoritarian relationships, which are common in the bureaucratic hierarchies; the practice of promoting or transferring the more able local government officers to the center; and the greater availability of secretaries, typewriters and supplies in the capital. 

Communication laterally among ministerial representatives at provincial and district levels also tends to be poor, and Philip Mbithi has written persuasively about the problems of communication between local government officials and the people. 

Finucane notes that the practice in most countries has been to rely on a modernizing bureaucracy as the agent of change in rural areas, but that this practice is not notably successful. He observes rather sourly that the Tanzanian leaders have specifically rejected this approach, seeking instead to decentralize power and involve the participation of the people in decision-making, but that to date the result has been much the same as in Kenya where a different philosophy of government prevails. Finucane and Mbithi emerged from their studies with the strong conviction that increased participation in decision-making at the local levels is essential for genuine rural development. Just how this can be brought about is somewhat less clear. 

Jon Moris has had many years of experience in rural East Africa as a scholar and administrator. In a paper delivered to the International Conference on Management Education for Africa in November 1976, he examined some of the reasons for poor performance at the local government level in both Tanzania and Kenya. He makes the case that the Western management tradition is inappropriate to rural East African realities. His case is admirably documented, thoughtful, and persuasive. He finds the western tradition culturally inappropriate, dependent on value systems and thought patterns not reinforced by the local culture, and requiring levels of equipment and methods of organization that are simply unavailable at the local level. 

Robert Chambers, who led a team evaluating the Special Rural Development Program (SRDP) in Kenya in the early 1970s, also focused on management as the chief obstacle to the success of rural development innovations. He devised and tested a programming and implementation management system (PIM), which worked with some success in the SRDP but seems to require very high-level analytical and administrative inputs at the top. 

These and other valuable studies point to the conclusion that local government is not performing satisfactorily in either Kenya or Tanzania; but the studies and additional anecdotal evidence give the impression that the situation in Tanzania is considerably more desperate than that in Kenya. This conclusion is drawn from a very unscientific sample of information sources but there are strong reasons to believe it may be true. 

The first is of course the initial conditions, which favored Kenya over Tanzania. As a result of the Emergency, by the time of Independence the Kikuyus in Central Province were already living in villages well served by access roads, and a land consolidation and registration campaign was fully underway. In addition, the educational infrastructure was considerably more developed, providing more trained people to serve in local government posts. 

The second factor has to do with the dynamism of local society in the two countries. Perhaps as a result of Tanzania’s serious efforts to decentralize decision-making and prevent the rise of unequal classes in the society, the only viable rural organizations in Tanzania seem to be TANU and the government bureaucracy. Finucane’s account of the decline and disappearance of the highly successful Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions described a process that apparently also occurred in the Chagga area in the coffee-marketing cooperative. Despite the emphasis on self-reliance in Tanzanian ideology, it seems that Tanzanian peasants have become more dependent than ever on the State and Party bureaucracies. 

In Kenya a somewhat different picture emerges. The Harambee self-help movement has received a good deal of scholarly attention. Initially Harambee groups were organized to construct school buildings, which the Government was then expected to staff with teachers. The movement has been viewed critically as a method of local extortion of governmental services. Occasional confiscatory or coercive methods were used in gaining participation at the local level. The movement, however, has not only survived but expanded to the point where cooperative effort is no longer confined to a local clan or community, often now encompassing provincewide cooperation for the building of technical institutes. The number of non-aided schools in Kenya is now said to exceed the number of aided schools. 

An interesting feature of the Harambee movement is its ability to command the participation of local people who made good. Government officials in Nairobi are expected by their home communities to contribute personally to the effort, both financially and by working to secure the central Government’s support for local projects. For one generation at least, the movement is providing an important continuing link between the governmental elite and the rural areas from which they came. 

Chambers also refers to groups of women in rural Kenya who banded together to raise funds to put iron (mabati) roofs on their houses. Having achieved success in their initial objectives, they have gone on to buying grade cattle, fencing dips, building better kitchens and lobbying for improved services from Government. In the Wakamba area, other women’s groups called Mweithia have organized to do communal work such as bench terracing. 

Much of the dynamism in rural Kenya is due to private enterprise. Small shopkeepers and local transport companies proliferate, at least in the more advanced provinces. The transport companies may be particularly important. In Tanzania one hears that peasants are reluctant to produce a surplus because of the difficulty of obtaining transport from the nationalized industry, and its cost when it is available. 

All this is not to imply that rural development is proceeding apace in Kenya and is totally stagnant in Tanzania. The ILO Report and the 1974-1979 Development Plan both indicate concern over the relatively slow pace of rural advancement in Kenya, and certainly the pace of activity varies greatly among provinces. Other reports indicate that agricultural and educational innovations have been more rapidly adopted in Tanzania than in Kenya. 

In general, however, the impression I gained from talking with a broad range of people is that the farmers in Kenya are doing better, and the people in general are better off, than those in Tanzania. One comparative example may illustrate the point: 

A tea company with plantations and factories in both countries finds that the production and processing costs of the finished product is 5.85 shillings in Kenya and 7.35 in Tanzania. In both count ties, smallholder production is processed in the factories. The farmers in Kenya receive 1.20 shillings per pound and those in Tanzania 0.90 shillings. 

          The difference, according to the knowledgeable person who told me of these prices, is accounted for by minimum wage laws in Tanzania, the low productivity of the workers, and the fact that the Tanzanian peasant must sell to a state-owned marketing organization rather than directly or through a cooperative. It may be argued that the higher cost of production is to Tanzania’s advantage, assuming that the market clears the amounts available for sale and no expansion of this type of production is desirable. But it is hard to see any advantage accruing to Tanzania from the lower price received by its producers. 

C. 4. Management Program

          The extensive and varied efforts by the East African governments to wrest control over their economies from Europeans and Asians are too complex to examine here in detail, but the difference in general approaches is neatly summarized by the following excerpts, the first from a speech by President Nyerere in 1968 and the second from “African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya:” 

“Ideological differences between countries affect the method, not necessarily the fact, of securing national control. The real ideological choice is between controlling the economy through domestic private enterprise, or doing so through some state or other collective mechanism. But . . . it is extremely doubtful whether it is a practical choice for an African nationalist. The pragmatist in Africa … will find that the choice is between foreign private ownership on the one hand and collective ownership on the other… a capitalistic economy means a foreign-controlled economy … The only way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the economic institutions of socialism.” 

“Under African Socialism the power to control resource use resides with the State. To imagine, however, that the use of resources can only be controlled through their ownership or that the appropriate ownership will guarantee the proper use of productive assets are errors of great magnitude. Ownership can be abused whether private or public, and ways must be found to control resource use in either case.” 

The difference in these two policy statements parallels those found in the section above: Tanzania dramatically and ideologically confronting a problem while Kenya approaches it more gradually and pragmatically. 

President Nyerere’s nationalization program, begun immediately following the Arusha Declaration, was anything but a pragmatic move. Parastatal organizations already in existence were having severe management problems; e.g., COSATA, a state trading firm set up by Government to compete with Asians in distributing goods, had to be retrenched because of operating losses; and big game hunting, nationalized in 1966, was denationalized in 1967 after the state company lost $250, 000. Investments by state enterprises were running at only one third of planned targets. The President’s decision to turn substantial responsibility for agricultural credit, marketing, and milling over to state corporations thus seriously increased the demand for managers at a time when they were already in critically short supply. 

Thus it was not surprising that when the Foundation decided to shift its program from the staff development field, where the Africanization process had largely been completed, and to scale down its work in economic planning, it should turn to public management as a high-priority field of endeavor. Training was to be the main theme for the public management program, with the objective of support for the development of African self-reliance. Since self-reliance depends on attitudes and competences, training is presumably the best way for an aid agency to foster its development. 

The public management program has had nowhere near the impact on East African development that both the Africanization and economic planning programs achieved. There are a number of obvious reasons why this result could have been expected, but they do not include the inadequacy of staff work in developing the program. Indeed, when one reviews the conferences, experimental projects and staff analyses that went into designing the public management program, one is struck by how much more Foundation staff effort was involved than in the earlier cases. 

Our work in staff development and manpower planning was designed by David Anderson and Robert Thomas in Tanzania, and replicated with some variations in Kenya, Zambia and Botswana. The conceptualization of the program by Kingsley and Thurston was valuable, but it did not and could not draw out an elaborate plan describing the eventual evolution of these activities. 

Similarly, the economic planning program was designed in Kenya primarily by Edwards, working in the Government itself. The representative and his staff maintained financial control of expenditures but could not have designed the program as it evolved. 

The public management program didn’t spring full-blown from the representative’s office; a great deal of consultation with African officials and others working in the management field went on, informally as well as in conference settings. Nevertheless, the program did not evolve from within Government on the basis of experience, as the others did, and that may have been a drawback to its success. The fault cannot be laid at the door of the Nairobi office. The operating style of the Foundation had so changed in the ten years since work began in East Africa that it had become necessary to articulate strategies and plan budgets one or two years in advance, in ways that would be found convincing in New York. This process always has an element of unreality about it because it requires a degree of clairvoyance and creative imagination on the part of the field staff, in addition to an ability to communicate a wide range of intangibles concerning operational conditions. 

A second factor affecting program prospects in public management was that after ten years of independence, the East African governments were less fluid and open to advice than they were in the early years. At independence the new governments rather desperately needed trustworthy advisors. The range of subjects on which the opinions of Anderson, Thomas and Edwards were sought far exceeded their specific tasks; they became trusted confidants, not just sources of technical information. In the course of time patterns and policies jelled, leaders became more experienced, and a greater supply of qualified local manpower was available; consequently, it would have been surprising if any outside assistance program could have had the vital impact of the earlier ones. 

Thirdly, full agreement was never achieved on the directions the public management program should take. It was less a question of strong competing strategies than a sense of uneasiness that any of the strategies proposed would really make much difference to the quality of management in East Africa. This reflected an awareness of the depth and breadth of the problem and of the meager resources the Foundation could devote to dealing with it. The East African budget was declining in dollar terms, the dollars were declining in value, and existing programs could not be terminated abruptly in order to free up substantial sums for new projects. Consequently, the East Africa office found itself attempting to do something about the most pervasive development problem of the region simultaneously in five countries, with pitifully small funds. 

The above reasons are in themselves fully adequate to explain the relative lack of success of the public management program to date, but there remains a more nebulous factor which needs to be considered: the cultural factor of management, which Hyden, Moris and others have been grappling with. 

Many people have commented on the cultural dimension of management. It generally appears around the end of the list of any diagnostic treatment of the shortcomings of management in Africa, the Middle East, and probably Asia and Latin America as well. Having labeled the problem, however, it is difficult then to devise ways of dealing with it. 

Most often cultural traits are deemed to be obstacles to be overcome by training. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid this viewpoint in the context of managing particular industries. The technology of a steel mill or an oil refinery, for example, dictates to a considerable extent the kind of behavior which will be required to make it function effectively. One suspects that, in less capital-intensive industries and service organizations, technological demands are less rigid, but it is difficult to find cases where management systems have been analyzed and designed to fit more comfortably the values and attitudes of the people who are to run them. 

One would think that it would be possible to analyze the methods and skills employed in modern management in order to determine the cultural sensitivity of each element. For example, financial and technological subjects (with due regard to the considerations of appropriate technology) would presumably be at one end of the continuum, while personnel management and organization might appear at the other. In other words, those elements involving financial or physical dimensions would presumably have more universal qualities, while those involving human relationships in the enterprise would be tailored more particularistically. On the basis of such an analysis it might be possible to devise management systems more appropriate to the culture in which the enterprise is meant to function. 

It is important to note here that the tendency of international training programs to rely on a rather standard western curriculum is not simply a question of cultural imperialism, cooptation or some other evil design. Indeed from what I’ve been able to discover, the westerners involved in the Foundation’s public management program were more concerned about the cultural problem than were their African colleagues. Significantly, both Tanzanian ministers with whom I discussed our program efforts felt that the Foundation had abandoned efforts in the management field too soon. As one succinctly put it, “There is a science of modern management which we need to learn.” 

One can readily understand the priority attached to the subject by these Tanzanian leaders. The East African Standard carried an article in December 1976 that purported to be based on a budget speech by the Minister of Finance on the state of the Tanzanian economy. After detailing gloomy figures of declining agricultural output and rising balance of payments deficits, the article makes the startling statement that twenty-four major nationalized companies between 1969 and 1973 had cumulative losses equal to 9l% of their total share capital. This figure, which has not been denied by Tanzania to my knowledge, lends credence to the raft of anecdotes about managerial incompetence circulating in Dar es Salaam. The seriousness of the problem is underlined by the fact, duly published in the Tanzanian Daily News, that for the last two successive years the Government Auditor has been unable to ascertain the financial position of many companies in the parastatal sector because of the inadequacy of financial accounting.  

© 2000 Development Strategies Inc. | Contact | Disclaimer | Privacy Policy