|
1.
Environment and People
There
are no generally accepted or satisfactory geographical definitions of
the Middle East. Those who
have undertaken to define it have been united in little more than the
belief that it has both being and boundaries. The territory in the purview of the Foundation's Middle East
office includes nine countries with a population of something over 109
million. The countries are
small, only two of them (Egypt and Iran) having populations of more than
25 million, while four have less than five million. Except for Iran, they are also of very recent origin as
independent states.
Virtually
the entire land area is arid or semi-arid and only a small fraction is
cultivable, ranging from three percent in Egypt to 16 percent in Iraq
and 30 percent in Syria. The
remainder is desert waste or stony mountains stripped of topsoil. Yet somewhere between two thirds and three-quarters of all
the people in the area are engaged in agricultural or pastoral pursuits.
In the deserts and the mountains, they eke out a precarious
livelihood with their flocks and lead a nomadic and pastoral life little
changed in recorded time.
By
contrast, life is settled in the river valleys of the Nile, the Tigris,
the Euphrates, and the smallest Jordan. In the great and ancient cities
of Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Tehran, physical modernization rushes
pell-mell along. This area,
for thousands of years, has been the crossroads of the world and the
melting pot of cultures. In
its cities today, Western pragmatism and materialism are in heady
conflict with the mysticism and stoicism of the East. But in more remote rural areas, the pace of change is slower and
preoccupation is still with ancient feuds and conflicts.
The
population is an agglomerate of many races, tribes and nationalities:
Semitic, Nilotic, Hamitic, Sudanic, Turks, Armenians, Berbers, Kurds. But except for the Persian in Iran, the dominant groups
everywhere either are, or consider themselves to be, Arab. Tribal, family and feudal ties are still strong amongst them and
national feelings (in the Western sense of nationalism) are growing
slowly as a result of contact with the West. *
There is undoubtedly a frustrated desire for a broader unity
which has led to repeated interference by one Arab country or another in
the internal affairs of its neighbors, thus contributing to the
political instability of the region. But the idea of an "Arab Nation" seems far more
romantic than real. It may
materialize in time and might be a powerful force in helping to surmount
the handicaps imposed on the area by its balkanization by the colonial powers
after World War I. But the
contrapuntal forces of traditional nationalism and of parochial economic
and political interests seem more likely to command the field than do
either Pan-Islam or Part-Arab movements.
*
"Nationalism in the Arab world should be understood as a function
of the Arabs' encounter with the West."
H. B. Sharabi, "The Crisis of the Intelligentsia," in
Richard H. Nolte, The Modern
Middle East.
Except
in the case of Lebanon (and, of course, of Israel), the dominant
religion in the Middle East is Islam. At its height, this once provided the focus, energy and drive
essential to unification of this diverse population. Islam is still a powerful influence, but it has suffered erosion
over time and the idea of an “Islamic Nation" would appear to be
even further from reality than that of the Arab Nation. Islam is itself split into two major and often conflicting groups
(Sunni and Shia) and into a variety of smaller sects like the Alawites
and the Druze. Significant
Christian communities also exist throughout the area -- Copts, Greek
Orthodox, Armenians, Maronites -- as do some remnants of formerly
important Jewish communities. There
exists, therefore, very considerable religious diversity and
inter-confessional tension which finds political expression in most
countries of the Middle East.
Much
has been written on the subject of cultural inhibitions to economic
development, and some undoubtedly exist. As Jacques Berques, amongst others, has pointed out, there is
much in the economic teachings of Islam that is antithetical to
development as experienced in the West. Islam "advocates immediacy in transaction, almost
simultaneous exchange. As
soon as there is delay in fulfillment, as in forward deals or limited
partnerships, the Arab hesitates. He
grows strongly suspicious of the very formulae to which world economy
owes its growth. It is founded on a study of probabilities, whereas Islamic
dogma proscribes the taking of risk..."
It
also proscribes the taking of interest and the making of money from
money. These attitudes
underlie much of the conspicuous consumption for which the wealthy of
the Middle East have been justly famous and explains the willingness of
more than one oil-rich sheik to build apartment houses in Beirut, for
example, but to make no effort to rent the apartments. Just as the Islamic world escaped the impact of the Cartesian
revolution it also missed the distorted dynamism of the Puritan ethic.
The
structure of the economies of the Middle East is relatively simple. Agriculture and husbandry occupy most of the population, and
improvements in these areas offer the greatest promise for raising
general living standards and providing a basis for solid economic growth.
Most agriculture is
on a subsistence basis at present and only Syria normally produces
enough to feed its population. All
other countries in the area are importers of foodstuffs and particularly
of cereals. Unless food
production can be expanded and more rapid progress made in population
control than now seems probable, the situation
will grow steadily worse as population increases at an estimated rate of
two and one-half to three percent a year.
Agricultural
products do occupy a significant place in the limited export trade of
the region: cotton (Egypt, Syria, Sudan); dates (Iraq, Saudi Arabia);
fruit and vegetables (Lebanon, Jordan); hides (Libya, Iraq). But it is petroleum that has raised the economies above the
subsistence level. Oil is
the most important factor in the economies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
the Gulf States, Iraq, Iran, Libya and -- potentially -- of the United
Arab Republic. Lebanon,
without oil of its own, prospers as a banking, commercial and service
center from the inflow of cash to which oil gives rise; and truncated
Jordan has lived since the June war on the subsidy provided by the
oil-rich Arab states. Syria
and Lebanon also share revenues from the pipeline traversing their
territories. Industrial
development is limited but significantly growing in Iran, Lebanon, and
the U. A. R.
Aside
from a few barter deals with Eastern European countries, the pattern of
trade is triangular and the balance of trade is generally unfavorable to
the region. The export
markets of the Middle East are (except for oil) largely confined to the
Middle East, and the Arab countries, in particular, are the best
customers of their Arab neighbors. To this, the United Arab Republic is a notable
exception. It has no significant trade with other countries in the Middle
East nor does it import significantly from Western Europe and America,
as the other countries in the area do. Despite its relative unimportance to the economy of the region,
the U. A.R. is the site of the secretariat concerned ith inter-Arab
economic cooperation and the Arab Common Market, the members of which
are Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait and Egypt.
Balance
of payments problems and attendant local currency difficulties plague
the area. These are clearly
due to serious mismanagement in the cases of Syria and Iraq, and to a
combination of inadequate resources and political adventurism in the
case of the U. A. R.
2.
The
Middle East as a State of Mind
There
are other ways of viewing the Middle East and other dimensions of its
being which may carry important program implications.
In
his stimulating book The Arabs,
Jacques Berques cites a definition of the Middle East (attributed to
Suhrawardi) as a condition of being suspended between the human and the
divine. One need not go the
whole distance down the path of poetic mysticism to see the Middle East
as a state of mind in which symbolism, poetry and mysticism play major
roles. Here, words and
signs have a transcendental quality that is quite exceptional, and their
function is evocative, rather than descriptive of objectively observed
or observable phenomena. This
is the state of mind which has produced three of the world's great
religions and which has, in turn, been shaped by them and by proximity
to their shrines and holy places.
It
is as dangerous as it is difficult to attempt to characterize in a few
sentences this special way of viewing the environment and one’s
relation to it. Yet it is
necessary to make the attempt, for social change and development are in
the final analysis psychological, reflecting changes in attitudes and
value systems and in turn reacting upon them.
On
some points and some observations there is widespread agreement amongst
Western scholars and those Middle Eastern scholars who have come under
Western influence. The
confusion of objective facts with personalized outlook is said to be
pronounced at all levels of society. This is accompanied by a dearth of analytical thinking and of
objective observation and evaluation. The real is not what can be seen to exist but that which is
willed. The capacity for
self-deception is thus almost boundless.
But
while agreement is widespread on the existence of this phenomenon, a
variety of explanations are advanced to account for it. Some focus on determinant elements in Islamic or Arabic culture,
others on the absence of elements identifiably present in Western
culture. Albert Hourani,
for example, traces it to the influence of Islam in decline, when
"the actions of the believer came to be controlled by a rigid legal
system and his mind to be dominated by a dogmatic theology which set
limits to the use of reason.” Or,
again, H. B. Sharabi suggests that “a major contributing factor to the
near-sterility of objective reason in Arab society may be … the
peculiar character and development of the Arabic language as a
culture-carrier. Through
the centuries form, rather than content, has become the end of
expression.” Others have
credited the isolation of the Middle East under the Ottomans from the
scientific and technical revolution sweeping Europe, or from the
industrial revolution with its day-to-day demonstrations of cause and
effect relationships. Few of the explanations are particularly suggestive for
programming purposes precisely because there are no single or simple
explanations.
Moreover,
this phenomenon and other facets of the state of mind that is the Middle
East are not confined to the Arabs. They are not, in other words, primarily expressions of Arabism,
but pervade the thinking and outlook of the diverse peoples occupying
the semi-arid zone stretching across the top of Africa and well into
western Asia. Similar tendencies to regard the symbol as more important
than its referent, to prefer form to substance, to eschew objective
logic, are said equally to characterize the Persians. In this instance, also, language may be a contributing
factor. Persian, like Arabic, is better adapted to poetic than to precise
expression. The mind of the
Middle East is literary rather than scientific, inspirational rather
than operational, intuitive rather than deductive.
If
this is true -- and there is a host of distinguished witnesses to its
validity* - it must profoundly affect strategy, the dynamics and the
pace of the modernization process and the character of programs designed
to facilitate it.
*
As an example from another standpoint, Yusif A. Sayigh in his Economists
and Economics in the Arab World observes that "by and large the
Arab student avoids topics or approaches requiring a mastery of abstract
constructs and models with a large content of mathematics, of advanced
statistical technique, or of deductive reasoning…"
There
are other significant characteristics of what may loosely be called the
Middle East mind that would also appear to have relevance, in the design
and execution of a program of development and in an understanding of the
area. As elsewhere in the
East, face and self-esteem are of exceptional importance. An ancient Arab proverb lists the five acts of virtue as:
"Looking into the Koran, looking at the Ka’bah, looking up
to one's parents, looking into Zamzam (the sacred well in Mecca), and
looking the world in the face.” In
temporal terms, the latter is certainly the most important as a guide to
behavior, and the extent to which "face" is an ultimate value
goes far to explain the unacceptability of the Johnson plan and all the
other Western proposals for resolving the Palestine refugee problem
through economic development and expansion. Closely related to this is what Albert Hourani has called the
"spirit of feud," stemming from the fierce code of honor of
the desert tribes (reflected in both the Old Testament and the Holy
Koran), with its emphasis on an eye for an eye and on the ethical
centrality of the principle of revenge. The material and pragmatic self-interest so clear to the Western
mind is a far weaker motivating force in much of the Middle East than
honor (face) or revenge (the spirit of feud).
Ancient
feuds and family and tribal rivalries still play major parts also in the
politics of the area and contribute to the instability of governments
and political structures. The
personal element looms large in part, at least, because of the generally
low level of social mobilization. Aside
from the highly organized and mobilized confessional groups in Lebanon
(always an exception), there are few significant social groupings beyond
the family and the clan. D.
A. Rustow has pointed to this as the most important single cause of
political unrest and instability in the area. "Political and social power is exercised
irresponsibly," he says, "since there is no effective
representation of interests to support or control the expanded power
structure." Leonard
Binder makes a similar point in commenting upon the ability of the
military to capture authority by force in Middle Eastern countries. This is, he observes, partly a consequence of their access to
weapons and partly due to the low level of social mobilization -- to the
disorganization or non-existence of other social groups. The disorganization extends to the administrative services, as
well, and civilian governments and political parties are sometimes less
effectively competent than the better trained and better organized
military.
3.
Program Implications and
Possible Priority Targets
The
preceding review is sweeping, selective, inevitably subjective and
designed to illustrate an approach to goal selection and to throw up
examples for discussion and consideration, rather than to outline firm
program objectives at this time. It
does point up some major problems and target areas for consideration in
terms of priorities, and may point to significant program opportunities
and to a possible programming framework. Some of the problems we are already working at in a substantial
way. Others we are touching
peripherally or not at all. Some
are so complex and so deeply rooted in the culture that there may be
little that we can hope practically to do about them.
For
purposes of discussion, I would suggest that we focus on five broad
target areas. These are
presented not as alternatives to the things we are now doing, but as
illustrations of different ways of organizing them and thinking about
them. We would, for example, continue to be concerned at times with
institution building. But
this would be in a resource base sense and not as an end in itself.
Two
of the priority areas are recognizable in traditional program terms --
the two sides of the Malthusian coin: expansion of food production and
control of population. Both
bear directly and fundamentally on living standards and an economic base
for development, and powerfully (though less directly) on political
stability. We are in
relatively good shape regionally in terms of planning, programming and
organization for expanded agricultural production. The program is by no means fully launched, but its elements have
been identified, its strategy mapped, and its goals determined. Refinement of goals, timetables and evaluative procedures will
continue, but the program is solidly based.
We
are in quite a different posture on population control, and little is
being done on the problem outside the U. A. R. and (through the
Population Council) in Iran. In
this field -- difficult as it is for both cultural and political reasons
-- we should undertake an activist leadership role. I propose to set up a staff task force to plan strategy and
tactics to this end, with the assistance and advice of Mr. Croley, when
he comes aboard in Cairo, and perhaps of others
from Bud Harkavy's shop. We
will, among other things, have to identify and seek out interested or
potentially interested individuals in and out of Government, assist in
the organization of voluntary associations in the field, help organize
and support demographic studies, concern ourselves with the improvement
of vital statistics, stimulate relevant forms of social research and
training, all preliminary to the formulation of national policy on
family planning or to the development of national programs.
The
three other target areas for present consideration and discussion are
closely inter-related. In
shorthand terms these are: 1)
intellectual and functional isolation; 2) patterns and methods of
thought; 3) political instability. All present special difficulty.
For
historical, political, religious and linguistic reasons, the Middle East
has long suffered a considerable degree of isolation from the rest of
the world; and this continues to be the case today. For long years, while the great scientific and intellectual
revolutions that have transformed the West were occurring, the area was
locked behind the sterile walls of the Ottoman Empire, feeding only on
itself and its own past. The
brief opening to the West that followed the collapse of the Turks, and
particularly the end of the colonial regimes, has now again been
narrowed by the political consequences of the existence of Israel and
particularly of the June war. The
increasing isolation is reflected in proscriptions against study in the
United States and other western countries; in a sharp decline in
exchange arrangements between Arab universities and those in the west;
in restrictions on the importation of western books and periodicals; in
restrictions on the travel of intellectuals and professionals; in the
"sequestration" of western institutions (American University
in Cairo, Al Hikma University in Baghdad) and the expulsion of foreign
professors.
So
long as the prevailing political climate continues, it is unlikely that
the Foundation can do a great deal to reverse the basic trend. We can, however, take advantage of every opportunity to decrease
the isolation, to stimulate dialogue between Middle East and West and
amongst the Middle Easterners themselves, particularly on a professional
or scientific level and amongst leadership groups. We can -- and should systematically plan to: make the optimum use
of high level travel-study awards; assist with salary topping and other
devices to provide senior American scholars to institutions in the area
who wish to use them; make hard currency available for the purchase of
books and periodicals where their exclusion results from a lack of
foreign exchange; stimulate and support appropriate conferences on
problems of the region or on scholarly topics which will bring Middle
Easterners together with their professional or political colleagues from
outside; stimulate and support the development of proper scientific,
scholarly and professional associations. Finally, an important element in such a program is training in an
appropriate western language, not necessarily but preferably English.
Even
more difficult is a direct attack on those methods of thought described
in the early part of this paper. The
paucity of analytical thinking and logical reasoning is, of course, most
evident in those areas properly the concern of the social sciences. While the physical sciences, as well as the social sciences, are
under-developed and have been neglected in the educational system as a
whole, there is no evidence to suggest that a substantial improvement in
the extent to which logical analysis is applied to social and political
problems will result from the training of more physicists or chemists. Wider acquaintance (through the general educational system) with
the general concepts of causality and probability might be helpful, but
the basic attack on this problem would seem to be through strengthening
the social sciences. Here, again, we require a carefully thought-out plan
involving training, research, instruction and the development of
professional consciousness and morale amongst Arab social scientists. It is proposed to have a staff task force on this problem, as
well, to be assisted, perhaps, by Fred Shorter from Ankara and -- on the
research side -- by a short-term consultant from the Social Science
Research Council. An
important element in a comprehensive program in this area has been dealt
with in Roy Jumper's paper, "Faculty Research Fellowships for the
Study of Economics, Political Science and Sociology in the Middle
East." Consideration should also be given to the modernization of
the Arabic language.
Finally,
some scattered thoughts on possible programmatic approaches to the basic
problem of political instability. This,
too, is a composite problem or cluster of problems. Significant contributing elements would seem to be:
1) the extremely low level of social mobilization, making
politics a parlor game of intrigue played by a few leading families or
military figures; 2)
imperfect perception and acceptance of the importance of the rule of
law, particularly in its constitutional aspects;
3) lack of executive capacity to deliver expected and required
services or even to maintain the security of the State;
4) lack of training and experience among political leaders,
parliamentarians and diplomats. Other
elements could be listed but these are certainly among the most
important. Perhaps mention
should also be made of the tensions inherent in a political order
comprising a number of too-small, artificially created governmental
structures.
Obviously,
the Foundation cannot hope to play a dominant role in increasing
political stability in the Middle East. However, we can shape our programs and focus our efforts in
directions that will contribute to the emergence of conditions more
favorable to political stability (though not the status quo: in a form
conducive to change). We
can, in a limited way, encourage a larger degree of social mobilization
through efforts to encourage the growth of associations of
intellectuals, professionals and other opinion makers. We can encourage and support research by local scholars on
problems of political organization. As we begin to focus on the issue, other possibilities will
come to mind. One of the
most hopeful would seem to be the private business sector, where one
exists.
We
are already launched on a program concerned with the development of law
and the concept of the rule of law. We need to broaden this program considerably and to plot its
development a number of years ahead. The forthcoming conference on law and development should be
followed next year by one on the problems of fundamental or
constitutional law in the area. In
addition for improving the teaching of law and the training of new
lawyers (as at Lebanese University), we need to find ways of working
with the legal profession as a whole.
We
have, for a number of years, recognized and been working at the problem
of executive capacity of governments in the area. The time has come for a careful evaluation of what has been
accomplished and what still remains to be done. Administrative reform and improvement can go on forever and we
are faced in this sector with a particularly difficult problem of
determining priorities and the point at which cost-benefit ratios
suggest we should put our efforts elsewhere.
Except
for the regional training course for Arab diplomats and the sessions of
the Executive Conference Program (U.A.R.), which have attracted
Ministers and Deputy Ministers, little has thus far been done with
political or quasi-political groups. There are opportunities that should be explored for conferences
both of the "Bilderbeug" type and of parliamentarians. We should also remain alert to appropriate conferences in the U.
S. which might be of interest to particular political figures, and New
York should be requested to keep us informed of any that come to their
attention.
The
above program suggestions are sketchy and half-baked. I hope they will serve to stimulate discussion that will lead
to their sharpening.
|
